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# STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

# POWER PROJECTION: FOUNDATION OF SUPERPOWER STATUS

BY

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United States Air Force

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#### ABSTRACT

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This paper explores the importance of power projection in relationship to a superpower's ability to function and be perceived as a superpower among other competing nations. It begins with defining superpower status and how the unique characteristics and trends of the post-cold war error differentiate a superpower from today's major powers. The emergence and tenets of today's National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy are then presented to emphasize their reliance on a credible U.S. power projection force to meet peacetime and wartime commitments abroad. Finally, the United States strategic mobility force is the critical element in U.S. military strategy. It enables U.S. to meet national security objectives and future warfighting trends by rapidly deploying active and reserve units from U.S. bases to the region where they are required.

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#### PURPOSE

The purpose of this paper is to explore the importance of power projection in relationship to a superpower's ability to function and be perceived as a superpower among nation. The hypothesis of this paper is that a credible capability to rapidly project military forces and sustain them globally is essential to the maintenance of superpower status by the United States. The paper assumes that the correct maintenance and use of military power has a direct influence on economic and political well being of the U.S.

The post-Cold War era is a time of readjustment.

Relationships of power change constantly, but how Americans respond to crisis, even small ones, in this time of transition will effect the nature of the changes yet to come. Only if it is ready to use its power when and as needed can the U.S. hope to shape the character and direction of the forces of change rather than be overwhelmed by them. Today American power to influence the shape of an eventual new world is enormous.

#### SUPERPOWER STATUS

"Whether a nation be today mighty and rich or not depends not on the abundance or security of its power and riches, but principally on whether its neighbors posses more or less or it."

--Paul Kennedy

# What is a Superpower?

A superpower is a hegemon.<sup>2</sup> But what is a hegemon and how is the term used? A hegemon is a world leader; it is a state

which to some large degree controls world political process.<sup>3</sup>
Robert Keohane defines hegemon as the "single dominant world power."<sup>4</sup> In the economic context, "hegemony is a as preponderance of material resources."<sup>5</sup> Joseph Hye defines hegemony..." as a situation in which one state is powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing interstate relations, and willing to do so."<sup>6</sup> Immanuel Wallersteing write, "Hegemony in the interstate system refers to that situation in which the ongoing rivalry between the so-call 'great powers' is so unbalanced that one power is truly primus inter pares; that is, one power can largely impose its rules and its wishes (at the very least by effective veto power) in the economic, political, military, diplomatic, and even cultural arenas."<sup>7</sup>

An example to illustrate the concept of hegemony is the United States in the mid-to late twentieth century. American hegemony dates back to the end of World War II. Having escaped the domestic destruction of war, the U.S. was able simultaneously to expand economically and to help finance the recovery of Europe. For over twenty years it dominated the world economy, supporting the global monetary system through the Breeton Woods Agreement and maintained a "sufficient" military.

"After this century's Second World War, the United States...found itself responsible for the peace, the prosperity, and the very existence of half the planet. GIs were stationed in Tokyo and Seoul in the Orient, in Berlin in Europe. The West had known nothing like it since the Roman Empire. The United States was the first truly world power, since there was no precedent for the global unification of the diplomatic scene."

Today the U.S. continues to maintain superpower status. As Charles Krauthammer so eloquently wrote, "The center of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies"9..."American preeminence is based on the fact that it is the only country with the military, diplomatic, political, and economic assets to be a decisive player in any conflict in whatever part of the world it chooses to involve itself..."10

Collectively, America's instruments of national power remain stronger than any of the world nations today:

### Economic

"We now have a truly global economy linked by an instantaneous communications network, which offers growing opportunity for American jobs and American investment." Today's U.S. economic outlook is optimistic, the share of GDP represented by exports of goods and services has more than doubled since 1965, from less than 5 percent to almost 12 percent. Imports have also grown in importance to U.S. economy, rising to a postwar high of 13 percent of GDP. And U.S. competive edge in overseas markets has increased dramatically. The U.S. was number one in overseas business deals last year. "Through our National Export Strategy, we have leveraged a \$250 million annual export promotion budget into at least \$45 billion in overseas deals."

# Political/Diplomatic

"Our extraordinary diplomatic leverage to reshape existing

security and economic structures and create new ones ultimately relies upon American power [economic and military]."15 To enhance global security America has pursued peace initiatives in the Middle East; established NATO's partnership for Peace and initiated a process that will lead to NATO's expansion; secured the accession of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and their agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons from their territory. Political power enable us to reached an agreed framework with North Korea that halted its dangerous nuclear program. But America's true political power and influence was seen in 1990 with its ability to bring 29 nations came together in a coalition in response to crisis in the Persian Gulf. A coalition conceived and built on American trust, credibility, and miliary might. America's political influence and diplomacy continues to be a major factor in bring peace to the Middle East.

# <u>Military</u>

Today, and for the foreseeable future, there is no foreign power able nor willing to compete broadly and effectively with the U.S. in the quality of modern arms and their associated technologies. America has the best military in the world today... able to meet the challenges from Iraq to North Korea to Haiti...

# The Post Cold War Period

It has become almost trite to say that the world has changed. Historians are likely to rank the demise of the

communist empire and the end of the Cold War with the French Revolution, the Protestant Reformation, and the Fall of the Roman Empire. But for us history is simply moving too fast to dwell on the monumental events themselves. Far more pressing is the fact that the definition of national security itself has changed and, with it, the whole conceptual foundation for the military services.<sup>18</sup>

This change is not merely a "transitional phase"; it is not a temporary slump in "business as usual." Those who imagine that the current pressures on military budgets and strategies is part of a cycle that will soon "correct" itself are seriously deluding themselves. What we're seeing is a reflection of reality that the entire geopolitical landscape has shifted; fundamentally and irreversibly.

For the first time since 1941, the U.S. has a real chance to step down from what has been a permanently mobilized wartime footing. America has become so accustomed over its lifetime to being poised on the brink of total war that we tend to forget what a world without a global threat really looks like.

Does this mean that military power is suddenly irrelevant? Absolutely not. Military forces will remain critical to the maintenance of our national interest. Maintaining the U.S. presence around the world, and maintaining the capacity to respond in a crisis will be absolutely crucial in heading off future crisis and dissuading future aggressors from challenging our vital interests and the interests that have built our

national power.<sup>20</sup> It doesn't take more than a quick glance at the daily paper to realize that the world is still a volatile place where old enemies, modern demographic pressures, and outright armed conflict provide the tinder that could set the globe ablaze once again.

It was the demise of the Soviet Union that ushered in an era of American worldwide engagement and armed intervention unprecedented in scope and frequency. In a brief 4 years the United States has launched a massive counteroffensive against the world's fourth largest army in the Middle East; invaded, occupied, and supervised elections in a Latin American country; intervened with force to provide food to starving peoples in Africa; and conducted punitive bombing raids in the balkans.21 The U.S. has sent troops on another humanitarian mission in Africa, and volunteered troops to serve as peacekeeping forces in the Middle East and in the former Yugoslavia. It has worked in the UN Security Council to enact punitive sanctions against at least a half-dozen international rogue nations. It has extended military protection to several important nations of Eastern Europe that have never before been part of an alliance with the U.S. And it has interceded in disputes among the former republics of the Soviet Union while maintaining its treaties and promises to allies such as Korea, Japan, and Israel.

Furthermore, problems at home can't be solved by leaving our vital interest overseas vulnerable and neglected. Those interest are susceptible, as they have always been, to disruption by

terrorist attack; local political, religious, and economic upheavals; regional conflict; and interference by outlaw governments.

#### Post-Cold War Trends

"In the Placeless Society ahead, the classical rules of warfare will forever change. Wars won't be fought to control territory, and the idea of a military "front" will become passe'. Aircraft carriers and rocket systems, "Star Wars" defense systems and thermonuclear bombs will be largely useless. The giant military machines that evolved over the past century will become anachronistic and of little purpose."<sup>22</sup>

#### --William Knoke

There is no other superpower threat on the world stage.

The Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union, even the Marxist ideology itself is fading. America is again a nation at peace; and as a result, our priorities, our interests, our role in the world, and our calculus of power are beginning to reflect the aspirations of what Jeanne Kirkpatrick has called a "normal" nation. But what does that mean, exactly?

"Normal," in this case, certainly does not mean "isolated. It never has, despite America's self-consciously "isolationist" rhetoric over much of its past. Even when we tried to ignore events overseas...even when we tried to hold the rest of the world at arm's length...we still maintained ties to the world through trade, travel, diplomatic missions, and defensive alliances.

"Normal" simply means that national strategy is no longer a

matter of military arms and strategy. The threat posed first by the Axis powers and then by the Warsaw Pact represented an oddity in our national experience. In time, historians may see the last fifty years as deviation from the norm.

Today's post-cold war U.S. security will depend on the balance of all the instruments of national power: economic, political, and military. America's military forces must embrace this reality if they expect to meet the nation's need, to earn the support of its public, and to warrant an investment of its finite resource. The services must recognize the increasing competition for a place on the list of national priorities. A list that is shaped by a public education system that is seen by as many as failing; by a staggering national debt; by a paralyzed legislature; by families that are disintegrating, both in terms of their social fabric as well as their infrastructure. Future trends will demand even more changes to our warfighting capabilities.

First, we have fewer forces to employ and station overseas. A growing deficit, ever increasing domestic needs, and the decreasing likelihood of major power confrontation demands a smaller but more capable force to strengthen our economic power. As Paul Kennedy put it... "wealth is usually needed to underpin military power, and military power is needed to acquire and protect wealth." 25

Second, America is reluctant to send young troops in harm's way. Since the end of the Vietnam War, Americans shy away from

commitments that might result in heavy U.S. casualties. The Gulf War was successful because of the small amount of American casualties. However, the American people now expect war to be fought in this manner-with little loss of life.<sup>26</sup>

Third, military operations will be quick, decisive and accurate. Again, the Gulf War set a precedent. War has become too expensive. No longer can nations afford the risk of what prolonged warfare in other nations. The international society is defined and linked together by economic ties, demographic movements, communications, transportation, and the physical environment. Today conflicts and war hurt not only the warfighting nation but others as well. "In all history there is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare. Only one who knows the disastrous effects of a long war can realize the supreme importance of rapidity in bringing it to a close."<sup>27</sup>

Fifth, technology is changing the face of war. Just as our technology and industrial defense base has vastly increased the combat effectiveness of our forces, so too is technology changing the arsenals of the world and the methods in which they are employed.

Finally, the 21st century the face of the enemy will change and with it battlefield. Wars will be placeless, without boundaries, battle fronts, fleets of ships, columns of soldiers, or tanks. "The wars of the twenty-first century will be fought in our streets as new pressures, alliances, technologies, and the

mobility of personnel bring a complete realignment to this thing called war."<sup>28</sup> However, until we reach "the wars of the future" future peace and stability in the world will continue to depend in large measure upon our willingness to project credible, rapid power overseas.

The ability of the military to project a positive American image, to build the foundations for viable coalitions, to enhance diplomatic contacts, to reassure friends, and to demonstrate U.S. power and resolution is part of what will keep regional frictions from shattering the first real peace the nation has enjoyed in over 50 years. It is a role that we're focusing on now, under the National Security Strategy originally established by President Bush and further enhanced by President Clinton.

# U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS)

"This is a period of great promise but also of great uncertainty...Without our leadership and engagement abroad, threats will fester and our opportunities will narrow."<sup>29</sup>

--A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement

In his Aspen speech, Bush said... "In a world less driven by an immediate threat to Europe and the danger of global war, the size of our forces will increasingly be shaped by the needs of regional conflict and peacetime [military] presence [abroad]."30 With this new posture, with its emphasis on regional conflicts beyond Europe, he noted, "America must possess forces able to

respond to threats in whatever corner of the globe they may occur."<sup>31</sup> To satisfy this need, he argued, "we will have to have air and sealift capabilities to get our forces where they are need, when they are needed."<sup>32</sup>

The new U.S. strategic posture was in place by the early summer of 1990. As General Vouno later put it... "the second of August 1990 will be remembered for generations to come as a turning point for the United States in its conduct of foreign affairs-the day America announced the end of containment and embarked upon the strategy of power projection." Ironically, enough it was the same day on which the Iraqi forces of Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait.

## Core Strategy

Though President Clinton's February 1995 NSS is quite similar to Bush's national security, Clinton separates U.S. national interests into three categories: physical security, projection, and economic prosperity. He also goes further to commit the U.S to maintaining a global interest. "While Cold War threats have diminished, our nation can never again isolate itself from global developments" But the most important outcome of the 95 NSS was the necessity of bringing together all the elements of national power under the roof of engagement and enlargement.

"The core of our strategy is to help democracy and markets expand and survive in other places where we have the strongest security concerns and where we can make the greatest difference. This is not a democratic crusade; it is a pragmatic commitment

to see freedom take hold where that will help us  ${\rm most.}^{\rm m35}$ 

The role that the U.S. would pursue was.. "First and foremost, we must exercise global leadership,"... "We are not the world's policemen, but as the world's premier economic and military power, and with the strengths of our democratic values, the United States is indispensable to the forging of stable political relations and open trade." Military power became the underlying emphasis on President Clinton's assertion "that the United States will remain an influential voice in international affairs-political, military and economic-that affect our wellbeing so long as we retain the military wherewithal to underwrite our commitments credibly." 37

# Military Power

In order to carry out that strategy, the military will continue to play a major role in securing our nations interest. Their role will be one of preventive diplomacy during peace and fighting and wining our nations wars during conflict. Power projection will be the fundamental foundation to advance our national interests in peacetime and in war.

"We believe that our goals of enhancing our security, bolstering our economic prosperity, and promoting democracy are mutually supportive. Secure nations are more likely to support free trade and maintain democratic structures. Nations with growing economies and strong trade ties are more likely to feel secure and to work toward freedom. And democratic states are less likely to threaten our interests and more likely to cooperate with the U.S. to meet security threats and promote free trade and sustainable development." 38

America' challenge will be its ability to meet the demands of an increasingly important economic power while maintaining the need to secure its future with credible military power projection. "We're in a new era-one full of promise. But events...remind us that there is no substitute for American leadership. And American leadership cannot be effective in the absence of America's strength."<sup>39</sup>

## U.S. National Military Strategy

"Although the size of our forces permanently stationed overseas and the size of some deployments have decreased in recent years, and in Europe dramatically, their importance has not diminished."

-- National Military Strategy, 1995

As America's approach to evolving national security concerns has changed over the years to meet the needs of a shifting geopolitical environment so has the National Military Strategy. As General Colin Powell put it.."The bottom line is that we can't act in the 1990s as if we had the same consensus of the early 1980s, or as if the geopolitical situation is the same...I believe we are going to have to make some hard choices...(The American Public will) support us, but not at any cost. They don't see that as reasonable under the changed circumstances in the world...Remember, the future ain't what is used to be."<sup>41</sup>

In 1991 General Powell published the first unclassified national military strategy. The containment strategy built on a credible nuclear deterrent and large overseas forces was all but

abolished. Instead the new strategy reduced our overseas bases, and to become a continental based contingency force. There would be enough forward presence left to facilitate U.S. forces that needed to come to the aid of allies, provide humanitarian assistance, or to unilaterally define a vital U.S. interest. Moreover, the first step was taken to link the economic needs with the reduction in force. This military strategy which places a premium on efficiency without compromising effectiveness is designed to be implemented with a significantly reduced defense budget. "44

Today two key objectives of the strategy are: First to thwart aggression through credible deterrence and maintain strong warfighting, second; to promote stability through peacetime engagement. Both rely heavily on projecting our forces abroad.

"The existence of a credible power projection capability compliments our overseas presence in acting as a deterrent to potential adversaries. It further provides our national leaders greater flexibility in employing military force." 45

# Power Projection

"...The American military's primary purpose is not so much in its overt use, but in its value as a deterrent force-in-being. There are threats that never materialize simply because the military is leaning against doors so that they cannot be opened."46

--Herman Kahn Nuclear Strategist

### Presence

America has gone from a Cold War strategy of "being there" to a post Cold War Strategy of promoting stability and preventing conflict.<sup>47</sup> It is this evolution in our overseas presence strategy that enables us to meet the challenges as described by President Clinton in A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. Today's overseas military presence of promoting stability and preventing conflict foster the core principle which quides our nation's policy-exercising global leadership.<sup>48</sup>

A strategy of overseas presence plays a crucial role in addressing these new challenges while building a foundation for effective U.S. engagement. In its very strictest form "presence is the posturing of military capability, including nonbelligerent applications, and/or the leveraging of information to deter or compel an actor or affect a situation." However presence goes beyond just deterring or compelling an actor or affecting a situation. It captures the very essence of projecting super power leadership globally by:

- Projecting a credible commitment to world peace thereby honoring security commitments and opening communication channels.
- Promoting regional stability to help promote global economic growth and democracy.
- Promoting trust and confidence to foster international cooperation.

Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the Arab Israel peace agreements. U.S. aid to Egypt and U.S. security assistance to Israel, together with the contribution of U.S. troops to the UN peacekeeping observer mission in the Sinai, gave Israel and

Egypt the necessary confidence to conclude the Camp David Accords in 1978. As with our commitment to the Sinai mission, the possibility of peace between Syria and Israel could be cemented with the promise of American force presence on the Golan Heights. 50

American presence facilitates engagement with traditional and nontraditional allies while advancing U.S. strategic interests. Presence opens new doors and dip into the untouched sanctums of the world's nations and regions to better understand their cultural and military capabilities. This knowledge provides America with the tools to create a more stable security environment in which to advance its interests. By understanding a nations culture through military-to-miliary relations we begin to understand how to build trust. Trust allows a nation to deploy into the region and conduct combined exercises. Through deployments and combined exercises the blueprints for military cooperation are established and the ties to securing U.S. strategic interests are strengthened.

In its efforts at regional engagement, the U.S. seeks to sustain and adapt security partnerships with key states throughout the region, broaden economic and cultural ties, and promote peaceful settlement of regional disputes before they widen into open conflict. To ensure that our policy of engagement can be carried out in a secure atmosphere, we must maintain force presence overseas. Forward presence is a key symbol of our commitment to deter regional aggressors. It promotes burden-

sharing by permitting training that helps strengthen local forces. It enhances our ability to deploy additional forces quickly without building permanent bases. The military compensates for the lack of permanent bases overseas by maintaining its military presence through a series of temporary rotating deployments. This avoids keeping the same forces in the same place long enough to create domestic dissatisfaction in the host countries. It gives U.S. forces realistic training in a region it may one day help to defend. This was not the case in Bosnia as witnessed by the many unexpected hurdles American troops had to overcome.

Nowhere has our efforts at regional engagement been more noticeable than in the Middle East. The only U.S. forces normally in the Gulf before 1979 were a command ship and two or three destroyers. Today, it is not unusual to have 20,000 US military men and women in the Gulf at any one time. Where we once had two or three ships in the Gulf, today we often have 20, teamed with scores of land-based aircraft and other units.

Moreover, our robust exercise program puts significant ground combat power into the Gulf on a regular basis. The presence of all these forces allows substantial military-to-military contacts, including discussions of combined strategy and joint planning to create working ties and facilitate crisis cooperation if U.S. and its allies interests are threatened.

Our Global presence provides the peacetime tools to further our interests and to deter aggressors by expressing American

power and intent. In the end, of course, influence and deterrence may simply fail to dissuade some future Saddam Hussein from attacking American interests, and the nation's armed forces will have to maintain the ability to fight and win when and where they need to.

## Warfighting

United States warfighting capabilities have been critical to the successful achievement of America as the sole surviving superpower. America has won with decisive victory in its epic wars-the Revolutionary War in the eighteenth century, the Civil War in the nineteenth century, and the Second World War and the Persian Gulf War in the twentieth. From these victories grew America's credibility with allies; global economic opportunities; individual freedoms; democratic regimes; and the power to deter aggression and arbitrate for peace. Today's need for a strong warfighting capability is no less critical if America is to play an influential role in world affairs.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union has led to a dramatic rise in instability and unrest throughout much of the world. Our national security now depends upon a strategy to control or limit this instability by remaining engaged, but without benefit of a large a permanent presence overseas. America must increasingly depend upon forces that can project power rapidly and globally from the United States to influence events abroad.<sup>52</sup>

#### Force Structure

The force is sized to meet the current national security

requirements as defined in the Bottom-up Review (BUR), the Mobility Requirements Study and the Nuclear Posture Review. 53

These forces are structured to fight and win two nearlysimultaneous major regional conflicts (MRCs). The key to this capability, as outlined in the BUR and reflected in President Clinton's national security strategy and the Defense Secretary's annual report, is... "to have forces of sufficient size and capabilities, in concert with regional allies, to defeat potential enemies in major conflicts that may occur nearly simultaneously in two different regions."54 During a recent briefing Secretary of Defense Perry was asked... "Could you fight two simultaneous regional wars now as you're currently structured and supported...?"55 His reply was yes. However he went on to say..."I might add one thing to that, that the stressing aspect, what our detailed war planning showed us, that where we were stretched in dealing with two major regional conflicts was not in the force structure, per se, it was in having sufficient airlift and sealift to swing from one theater to another if the two of them happened too close together."56

### Shortfalls

While Secretary Perry's statement was made in January 1996, the BUR identified the same shortfall in 1990. In 1996, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. when talking to Air Force Legislative Liaison alumni, highlighted the importance of strategic mobility... "The nation's greatest military deficiency in the near term is strategic lift-both sealift and airlift." 57

And the recent Mobility Requirements Study-BUR Update identified a very real need for at least 120 C-17 equivalent aircraft to support the warfighting CINCs during the first thirty days of a conflict. The present core airlifter, the C-141, was designed to carry Army equipment of the 1960s. The C-5A has the lowest mission capable and departure reliability rates within the U.S. military airlift fleet. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet faces a large shortfall in aeormedical evacuation capability. Further more, although modernizing, America's militarily useful sealift assets remain short of projected ocean movement requirements.

## Mobility

The United States could not function significantly in the balance of power role unless its armed forces had transoceanic reach. With few forces stationed overseas, less time to react in a crisis, an increase use of military power to solve global problems, and the bulk of our warfighting power stationed in the U.S., rapid global mobility becomes critical. It enables us to protect our interests, support our allies, and react rapidly to crises anywhere around the world. From major regional conflicts to natural disasters in far corners of the globe, when crises erupt, the world looks to and calls upon the United States for help.

#### Combat Forces

"The ability of US Armed Forces to fight and win, serves as the ultimate guarantor of our vital interests." Many of our nation's political and economic interests lie abroad. The United

States has vital economic interests in throughout the globe. An enduring challenge we face as a nation is the ability to respond rapidly to protect our national security interest and humanitarian crises across the globe. To meet this challenge, we must be able to reach around the world, over 12,500 miles.

Today the majority of U.S. forces must be projected from the United States. Additionally, several forces and equipment already deployed overseas supporting our strategies of peacetime engagement, deterrence, and conflict prevention will be needed when crisis turns to conflict. This power projection could ultimately entail the transport of large numbers of personnel, aircraft, and equipment. "It is important to note that during the initial weeks, 75 percent of the cargo that must go by air will be outsized and oversized equipment - Army helicopters, Patriot battalions, trucks. These can only fit on the C-5 or C-17..."60

The Gulf war required 90 percent of U.S. airlift and 87 percent aerial refueling aircraft and almost 100 percent of sealift capability. 61 Today all three of these power projection tools have decreased in number and reliability.

## Air Refueling Capability

The Air Force is the primary service for all air refueling.

Its air refueling assets enable the United States's power projection force to respond rapidly to national security concerns anywhere in the world with a variety of military capabilities.

They maintain this nations strategic agility. With strategic

agility, U.S. military forces can operate unconstrained by geographic barriers and can reach 100 percent of the world's population. Whether it's fighters deploying Bosnia, strategic bombers being used for a "show-of-force" in the Persian Gulf, surveillance aircraft monitoring Iraq for force movements, airlift aircraft transporting humanitarian goods to Somalia, or the 82d Airborne being transported to Haiti they all need fuel.

Airborne refueling assets act as force multipliers, giving forces the flexible and selective engagement called for by the national military strategy. It enables airborne power projection forces to anchor in one location and rapidly swing them to other locations. This enables military forces, far removed from any target, to deliver aid or combat capabilities within minutes or hours of a national decision to act.

Air Mobility Command's recent Tanker Requirement Study concluded the Air Force had sufficient refueling assets to meet the two MRC requirement. 62 However, the study neglected to consider: the increasing needs of the U.S. Navy caused by progressive retirement of naval refueling aircraft; needs of coalition partners and allies; the deterioration of the U.S. Air Force's KC-135 due to corrosion; and the impact of reduced commercial available parts inventories due to commercial retirement of the commercial DC-10.

"More and more, the national command authorities turn to the military because is one of the few elements of our government which has consistently demonstrated the ability to respond and

make things happen on a global basis." Our leaders must identify the best military power to maintain it's superpower leadership well into the next century. A military to support the National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement -- rapid global reach with appropriate global power.

#### Conclusion

The United States will continue to be perceived as a superpower by other major powers and lesser nations because of its overwhelming economic might and international interdependence. The ability of the nation to rapidly project power and intervene decisively gives credibility to its overseas commitments.

In response to the growing national requirements of engagement and economic domestic concerns, "presence" should be readdressed-what it is, why we do it, and how best to support joint requirements. This does not mean permanent presence is not imperative in many areas. But the United States should balance overseas forces with its capability to enforce or project force. The concept of presences should include all peacetime applications of military capability that promote U.S. influence regardless of service.

Finally, as important as engagement is, warfighting capability is the military's foremost priority. In those cases where aggressors are undeterred, military power must be capable of fighting and winning the nation's wars. Projecting that power

is critical for resolve. Continued investment should be done in the area of airlift and sealift. Unless force structure decreases, AMC should reassess its tanker requirement.

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